IDENTITY, NORMS AND BELIEFS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Special Editor: Kornely K. Kakachia

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The Portrayal of “The Other” in Foreign Policy Discourse and Public Consciousness in Armenia (2008–present)

By Aram Terzyan and Narek Galstyan, Yerevan

Abstract:
Conventional wisdom posits that the evocation of “the other” in a state’s foreign policy discourse is indicative of the core characteristics of its foreign policy identity. “The other” is largely deemed to be a symbol in the definition of who “we” are—our identity. A discourse analysis of Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan’s conceptions of “the other,” coupled with public opinion surveys, sheds light on major ups and downs that the convoluted relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey have undergone since 2008. Evidence indicates that Sargsyan’s determination to break the deadlock was not reciprocated by Azerbaijan and Turkey. The latter stepped back from its commitment to establishing unconditional relations with Armenia coupled with Baku’s upgraded bellicose policy towards Armenia. All this led Armenia’s president to toughen his position toward them, which found vivid expression in Armenia’s foreign policy discourse. Moreover, the tough resonated with Armenian society and further cemented negative social attitudes towards Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The Portrayal of Turkey in Serzh Sargsyan’s Foreign Policy Discourse

The very outset of Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency coincided with large-scale geopolitical exigencies in the South Caucasus given the deterioration of Russian–Georgian relations which ultimately escalated into a “five day” devastating war in August 2008. The unfreezing of “frozen” conflicts sent ripples of apprehension through Armenia regarding the likelihood of instability “spill-over” into the country.

To mitigate possible risks, Sargsyan expressed determination to move beyond deep-rooted hostilities and identify an ingenious recipe for peaceful co-existence with Azerbaijan and Turkey. To this end, the president placed a special emphasis on redefining Armenia’s general and foreign policy identities, a process deemed to be absolutely essential to achieving a breakthrough in regional cooperation: “We should formulate and define a new Armenian identity. An identity which should become our beacon in the new century …”1 The call implicitly pointed to the necessity to resolve Armenian–Turkish disputes and turn the page on long-stalled thorny relations. The notions of “zero-problems with neighbours” and “rhythmic diplomacy” adopted by Ankara seemed to reflect Turkey’s new take, particularly on normalization of Armenian–Turkish relations previously perceived as a “red line” issue. This tendency received further impetus from Ankara’s proposal (in 2008) on the establishment of a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.” The new developments found their expression in Sargsyan’s foreign policy discourse, which was characterized by a strong emphasis on the notions of a united Caucasus and Armenian–Turkish rapprochement.

To bring these visions to fruition, Sargsyan made a crucial step by inviting the Turkish president to visit Armenia on September 6, 2008, to watch the World Cup qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey. Abdullah Gül’s historic visit to Yerevan coupled with President Sargsyan’s commitment to establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey without setting pre-conditions seemed to challenge the status-quo profoundly. Regrettably, the optimistic rhetoric did not translate into reality. Shortly after signing the protocols on the establishment and development of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, the latter stepped back from its commitment to establishing relations with Armenia without preconditions. Witnessing Ankara’s deficit of political will to achieve a breakthrough, Sargsyan repeatedly expressed his deep disappointment. The disillusion inexorably led Armenia’s president to toughen his position vis-à-vis Turkey: “The policy of ‘zero problems’ with the neighbours yielded zero results. It is happening because Turkey is trying to solve all problems with the neighbours at the expense of the neighbours.”2 The glimmers of hope pinned on Turkey’s fundamental transformation and launch of a new policy toward Armenia rapidly vanished, recalling bitter memories about the Ottoman yoke. Turkey’s about face had deep repercussions with Armenian society, reinforcing fears that Turkey’s imperial nature has in fact remained

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unchanged. Sargsyan’s discourse expressed this idea clearly when he branded Turkey’s regional policy a vivid manifestation of a “New Ottomanism.”

“To hell with ratification.” This crude phrase, which President Sargsyan delivered to Ankara at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly on September 24, 2014, is indicative of the ups and downs that his position towards Turkey has undergone throughout his tenure. Unsurprisingly, on February 16, 2015, President Sargsyan sent an official letter to the Chairman of the National Assembly Galust Sahakyan in order to recall the Armenia–Turkey protocols from parliament.3

In essence, Sargsyan’s initial attempts at redefining Armenia’s foreign policy identity to bring it in line with Armenian–Turkish rapprochement proved futile. Turkey’s ambivalent policy towards Armenia inevitably led Sargsyan to rethink his initial optimistic takes on Armenian–Turkish rapprochement. Subsequently, the terms “Ottoman,” “destructive,” “belligerent” and “unreliable” became the core characteristics of Turkey in Sargsyan’s foreign policy discourse.

The Evocation of Azerbaijan in Sargsyan’s Foreign Policy Discourse

From the very outset of his presidency, Sargsyan invariably stressed the necessity of displaying political will to achieve a breakthrough in Armenia’s hostile relationship with Azerbaijan. Sargsyan has consistently emphasized that Azerbaijan’s anti-Armenian bellicose propaganda coupled with the full-blown arms race doom the initiatives of regional cooperation and conflict settlement to failure. This disappointment particularly applies to the EU’s peace-oriented Eastern Partnership. Sargsyan questioned outright the viability of its regional cooperation component, asserting that Azerbaijan’s resolve to extort unilateral concessions from Armenia render it meaningless. In his view, there is no common ground between Armenia and Azerbaijan because of the latter’s belligerent and uncompromising policy.

Nevertheless, unlike his predecessor, Sargsyan has utterly rejected the identity-based notions of ethnic incompatibility between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. He has made a clear distinction between the Azerbaijani state and society, expressing a hope that the people of Azerbaijan, or a significant percent of them, do not endorse state-run Armenophobic propaganda: “I am confident that our peoples will have a better future than the one contemplated by some leaders who preach hatred and war… I do not consider the people of Azerbaijan to be the enemy of the Armenian people. We are capable of respectfully resolving our disagreements and peacefully co-existing as neighbours.”4

Sargsyan has fiercely criticized speculations about the religious nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, asserting that any attempt to provide the dispute with a religious motivation is not constructive.

Interestingly, Sargsyan has tended to question Azerbaijan’s European identity. It follows that Azerbaijan has largely misperceived the essence of European integration, viewing Europe as merely a convenient market for selling oil and gas.5 This argument is supported by Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s policies toward the blockade of Armenia, which in fact have nothing to do with the core characteristics of European identity.

In Sargsyan’s view there are substantial divergences between the characteristics of “the other” and European identity. The latter is unequivocally associated with a peaceful, free and democratic path of development. Unsurprisingly, in Sargsyan’s foreign policy discourse, Azerbaijan is largely associated with the terms “non-democratic,” “belligerent,” “bellicose,” “destructive,” “Armenophobic”, etc (see Table 1).

Table 1: The Portrayal of “the Other” under Serzh Sargsyan’s Presidency (2008–Present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Other</th>
<th>Discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan (elite)</td>
<td>Armenophobic; Bellicose; Belligerent; Non-democratic; Destructive, (uncommitted to a negotiated outcome to the conflict), Non-European (misperceived the essence of European identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (elite)</td>
<td>Unreliable; Imperial (referring to New Ottomanism); Obstacle to Armenia’s European integration; Belligerent and destructive</td>
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The Image of the Enemy in Public Consciousness

Evidence indicates that the public perception of Turkey and Azerbaijan does not differ considerably from the official position: Armenians perceive both countries as the coun-

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try’s main enemies. However, the public assessment of the degree of “hostility” of Azerbaijan is higher than that of Turkey. But given the possibility of multiple answers (“Integration Barometer” (IB), “Baromet.am” (BAM)), “indexes of hostility” for these countries are higher and closer, while when respondents are allowed to choose only one answer (“Caucasus Barometer” (CB)), the majority brands Azerbaijan as the country’s main enemy. Figure 1, based on the CB survey (2011–2013), indicates that only Azerbaijan is considered by more than half of respondents as Armenia’s enemy. Results of IB (2014) show that with the possibility of simultaneous multiple answers, Azerbaijan is again “ahead of” Turkey. However, in this case, the overwhelming majority considers both countries as hostile to Armenia. The BAM survey also shows that Azerbaijan is the most hostile country (first answer); the second position is occupied by Turkey. Moreover, according to the study “Armenia–Turkey” (2014), 77% of respondents believe that Turkey pursues a hostile policy towards Armenia, and 82% of respondents believe that Turkey cannot be trusted.

Interestingly, Azerbaijan and Turkey are considered hostile countries towards Armenia by an absolute majority (or higher) of all age, education, gender, and settlement groups. However, a comparison of the results of CB (2010) and “Armenia–Turkey” (2014) indicates certain changes in public perceptions: 1. the number of those who believe that Turks have a positive attitude towards Armenians rose nearly twice, 2. the number of respondents who believe that Turks are neutral to them increased about 10%, and 3. the number who are convinced that Turks hold negative attitudes towards Armenians decreased almost 20% (see Figure 2).

Another indicator of the deep-rooted mistrust of Azerbaijanis and Turks is that the “enemy image” in Armenia’s society has both political and social dimensions. CB survey (2009–2013) shows that a stable absolute majority of respondents does not endorse business undertakings with Azerbaijanis and Turks, and a stable majority opposes marriages with them (see Figure 3 overleaf). It is noteworthy that Azerbaijanis and Turks are the only nations with which the majority of respondents disapprove of business dealings.

Nevertheless, in the case of marriages, they are no exceptions: at least an absolute majority of the respondents does not approve of marriage with representatives of any other nationality. However, in this case, the Azerbaijanis and Turks have the most negative rating.

**Public Attitudes toward the Normalization of Relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan**

Armenia’s citizens are sceptical about the likelihood that their country will be able to normalize relations with Turkey. This attitude becomes evident when consider-
ing the results of quantitative surveys on certain issues. Although it is well-known that Turkey itself unilaterally closed its border with Armenia in 1993, the number of those opposing the opening of the Armenian–Turkish border in Armenia has increased over the last five years. Comparing the results of the CB (2010) and “Armenia–Turkey,” the number of those who oppose opening the border by meeting Turkish preconditions almost doubled, reaching 88%, but the number of supporters of the borders’ opening without these preconditions has increased by almost 10%, reaching 51% in 2014 (See Figure 4). This tendency persists even though in 2010 around 50% of respondents tended to believe that the opening of borders would have a positive impact on the Armenian economy, while 60% also believed that doing so would engender negative effects on Armenia’s national security.

Interestingly, 44% of respondents in Yerevan are not aware of the Armenian–Turkish protocols on the normalization and establishment of diplomatic relations (2009). Yet nearly 40% believe that it is necessary to denounce these protocols whereas the adoption of these protocols (unilateral or after the ratification by Turkey) is endorsed only 16% of respondents (BAM).

Public attitudes towards the issue of compensation by Turkey for the Armenian Genocide, once Turkey recognizes this genocide, is noteworthy. According to BAM (2014), the vast majority of respondents from the capital Yerevan are convinced that Armenia should demand from Turkey all kinds of compensation. Efforts to seek territorial claims occupy the second position (30%). The relevance of territorial claims (after recognition of the Genocide) is also supported by the study “Armenia–Turkey.” Distrust towards Turkey and Azerbaijan is also expressed in terms of resolving the Karabakh conflict. According to CB 2011, almost 70% of respondents tended to oppose any Turkish involvement in a Karabakh settlement, and only 8% approved of a small role for this country.

It is noteworthy that while the absolute majority of respondents from Armenia and Azerbaijan consider a negotiated outcome to the Karabakh conflict settlement more likely, however, unlike Armenians, Azerbaijanis are less inclined to rule out the possibility of a new military conflict (see Figure 5 overleaf).
Conclusion
To sum up it is worth noting that President Sargsyan’s discourse *vis-à-vis* Azerbaijan and Turkey has undergone considerable changes throughout his tenure. Huge disappointment in expectations for reconciling with Turkey led Sargsyan to toughen his positions, which shifted from optimistic to critical. The latter was precipitated by Azerbaijan’s bellicose propaganda coupled with its belligerent policy towards Armenia, as well as Turkey’s abrupt withdrawal from its commitment to unconditionally establishing diplomatic relations.

Public attitudes towards Turkey and Azerbaijan do not differ significantly from Armenia’s official position. Yet, the public is somewhat more critical and straightforward. All the examined quantitative studies clearly indicate the public considers both countries as Armenia’s main enemies. These countries are perceived as hostile to Armenia, and there is a deep and total mistrust of Turks and Azerbaijanis. This way of thinking has not changed significantly during the last five years, even throughout the process of Armenian–Turkish alleged rapprochement—often branded as “football diplomacy.” Moreover, the majority of the Armenian population currently does not support the initiative for reconciliation.

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Further Reading
• Alla Mirzoyan, Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West: Between History and Geopolitics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Figure 5: Likely to Find a Solution to the Karabakh Conflict … (%)

![Bar Chart](http://caucasusbarometer.org)
Postcolonial Hybridity, Contingency, and the Mutual Embeddedness of Identity and Politics in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Some Initial Thoughts

By Murad Ismayilov, Cambridge, UK

Abstract:
Azerbaijan presents itself as a country fitting in with Western values while simultaneously adhering to Islam and associated traditional values, while also sharing some identity features with Russia and Turkey. This article provides a brief, yet critical, analysis of the dynamics of Azerbaijan's foreign policy and the country's national identity to make the case for the mutually derivative—and hence contingent—nature of the two.

(1) “There have so far been no cases in Azerbaijan of discriminatory practices on national or religious grounds, given [one’s belonging to] different civilisations or [one’s sexual] orientation, and the like… We are not accustomed to dividing guests by religious, national, gender, or other categories. These [LGBT—Author note] people can fully rely on the hospitality, tolerance, and modernity of Azerbaijan, and there will be no problem for their free and relaxing stay in our country.” [Ali Hasanov, head of department for social and political issues, President’s Office, 25 May 2011, <http://news.day.az/politics/269446.html>]

(2) “The people of Azerbaijan continue to adhere to Islamic values and thinking; we in the religious sense rely on Islam, there is an Azerbaijani model of Islam” [Ali Hasanov, head of department for social and political issues, President’s Office, 21 May 2012, <http://news.day.az/politics/333625.html>].

The above quotations highlight the Azerbaijani elite’s use of varying discourse to address concomitantly—in anticipation of Baku’s hosting of Eurovision’s 2012 edition—Western criticism of the country’s alleged mistreatment of representatives of the LGBT community, on one hand, and Iran’s criticism of the country’s overwhelming openness to the same, on the other; the presidential aide emphasising his country’s adherence to Islam and traditional values in pursuit of legitimacy with Iran and the broader Moslem community, yet citing Azerbaijan’s modernity and associated liberal values in pursuit of recognition by Europe and the West more broadly. This hybrid intentionality associated with the Baku elite’s involvement with Eurovision represents a microcosm of a broader pattern of dynamic interaction between, and the mutual embeddedness of, the country’s foreign policy dynamics and the evolving realm of its identity, on one hand, and brings to light the heterogeneity of both, on the other. This article provides a brief, yet critical, analysis of the dynamics of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and the country’s national identity to make the case for the mutually derivative—and hence contingent—nature of the two, a condition that renders the product of one dynamic embedded in the structural effects of the other.

The Contextual Embeddedness of Azerbaijan’s Identity Dynamics: The Heterogeneity of Exogenous (Domestic and Foreign Policy) Determinants of the Identity Discourse at Home

On one level, the dynamics of national identity formation in post-Soviet Azerbaijan—and the hybrid nature of identity the latter process worked to engender—has been derivative of the elite’s multiple—tactical—engagements across domestic and foreign policy fields in pursuit of immediate (ad hoc) legitimacy and survival. There are at least two ways in which this mechanism has unfolded: one associated with the elite’s pursuit of legitimacy at home, the other revolving around their quest for international recognition.

International Legitimation
Not many political units—whether present day nation-states or their historical equivalents—could afford to disregard their international and/or regional surroundings in pursuit of “national” wealth and internal organisation (political institutionalisation), particularly in the early years of political formation. To the extent they could, they would either enjoy a scale that would afford them a certain degree of self-sufficiency (e.g. the United States, China, Russia) or would be pushed to remain on the margins of historical reality (e.g. N. Korea, Iran until recently). Other than these cases on the extreme ends of the range of possible outcomes, most polities are in need of external (international) recognition to be able to function, a reality formally embedded in the world’s political organisation since the advent of the United Nations and one into which Azerbaijan was (re)born in the wake of the Cold War. International (including in large measure Western) recognition had to be enlisted if the state was to continuously function as an “independent” political unit. For Azerbaijan (as for other
states in the post-Soviet bloc), the latter quickly came through, and in the form of, membership in the United Nations, which the country secured in March 1992, and in a number of regional institutional formations, including the CSCE/OSCE in January 1992, its Helsinki Final Act in July 1992 and its Charter of Paris in December the following year; these apart from a whole series of individual acts of mutual recognition that were extended through different bilateral frameworks. While these latter acts of bilateral and multilateral recognition extended a shield of juridical endorsement to Azerbaijani statehood, they fell short of protecting or otherwise (e.g. economically) sustaining it; hence, the continued need for deeper—substantive—recognition beyond the formality of legal categories.

While for those states that could afford to bear the cost of non-recognition, the latter condition—in light of the reality of present dynamics—would place them in a position to dictate the terms of globalisation (the US) or would afford them the luxury of not falling into the globalisation trap (for the better or worse of it) (e.g. Saudi Arabia, N. Korea), those like Azerbaijan that were too weak (or too cowardly? too wise?) to join the ranks of either of the above, had—by virtue of the continuously instantiated impulse to be recognised beyond the limits of their national selves—subjected the evolving nature of their domestic environments, including in large measure national identity dynamics, to the (unintended) effects of their unfolding engagements across the international realm. This unequal ratio between the international and the domestic manifested early on, including in the country’s early-independence constitutional reform effort, its resultant 1995 constitution (still effective, if with amendments, today) having borrowed considerably from similar efforts of other post-Soviet states (particularly of the Baltics) on one hand and from available experiences of Western “democracies” on the other; these to ensure compliance of the country’s emerging legal identity with the norms and standards of international (read Western) constitutionalism.

Subsequent years of Azerbaijan’s independence witnessed two major channels by which the attitudinal and broader cultural effects of the national elite’s pursuit of the recognition game across the international spectrum of power have been diffused onto the country’s ideational realm: the unfolding dynamics of the country’s bilateral pursuits, on one hand, and its multilateral engagements, particularly in the realm of sports and culture, on the other.

The dynamics of the country’s engagements with four power centres have been particularly consequential for the evolving nature of its collective identity—Turkey, Russia, the West (the United States and Western Europe), and the Islamic world—each pulling the nation’s ideational makeup in distinct, often colliding, directions.

The elite’s struggle for Western recognition—and the pursuit of cultural and geopolitical legitimation with the West the latter aspiration entailed—worked, on a par with the elite’s cognitive embeddedness in their Soviet past and contrary to the effects of their involvement with much of the Moslem world, to impart—and naturalise—a secular and modern vision for statehood, on one hand, and prompted the rise of the culture of consumerist individualism, on the other; the nation’s susceptibility to westernisation (artfully disguised—and again naturalised—as globalisation) also facilitated through the population’s nearly “natural” exposure to a range of now pervasive media, including Internet and online social media, pop culture and Western music, Hollywood films and associated values of forced socialisation and de-privatisation of private life and marketisation of public pursuits, fast food and associated—McDonald’s and Starbucks (individualist/corporate)—culture. The nation’s access to various expressions of Western culture has further been facilitated through their work in and other kinds of exposure to the Western corporate environment at home, particularly as embodied by international oil corporations and audit firms that both established their presence in Azerbaijan following the latter’s independence; their now frequent travels to the US or Europe (be that for leisure, study, or work); NGO involvement and the intimate engagement with the Western discursive realm the latter entails; and, finally, in view of the state’s hosting international cultural or sports events of which the Eurovision Song Contest (May 2012) and the European Games (June 2015) have been by far the most important (and massive) to date. While these encounters have served primarily to “globalise” the intra-state cultural dynamics, they—particularly those facilitated through the government’s hosting of massive international events at home—have also worked to indigenise it, both by providing alternative, externally conditioned domestic venues for socialisation and discourse and offering new modalities of survival for the indigenous elements outside the mainstream discourse.

Azerbaijan’s intimate engagement and close association with Turkey throughout the post-independence years have been critical in terms of developing an ethnic angle to, indeed ethnicising, the otherwise civic cloak in which the ruling elite—since Heydar Aliyev came to power in 1993 and in view of the many ethnic minorities that call Azerbaijan their home—sought to wrap the nation’s post-independence identity pursuits. The now famous “one nation—two states” discourse that the country’s elite have used to describe
the nature of Azerbaijan’s interaction with Turkey in a quest to invoke a sense of inter-country unity based on a notion of common ethnic belonging (“(pan-)Turkic identity”) has in that sense been in direct opposition to the ideology of Azerbaijanism the same elite had suggested should inform top-down efforts at nation-building. While the latter discourse (Azerbaijanism) emphasised and was meant to inculcate an inclusive, civic definition of Azerbaijani collective—national—self (one merging the notions of nationality and citizenship in a single conceptual whole) and thus incite the people to espouse a rather cosmopolitan agenda for the nation’s developmental trajectory, the former narrative (pan-Turkic association and the primacy of ethnic belonging) used the language of ethnic ties and kinship to incite the Azerbaijani and Turkic peoples to a common vision and cooperation thus imposing a rather communitarian—ethnocentric—perspective on their conception of the country’s future. Among the major platforms of Turkish cultural penetration in Azerbaijan over the past two decades have been the engagement of Turkish businessmen in Azerbaijan (particularly in the food and restaurant industries), Turkish broadcasting, mutual student exchanges, as well as the operation of Turkish educational establishments (including numerous lyceums and the Qafqaz University) and Turkish-sponsored mosques in Azerbaijan (none of which has indeed been unproblematic).

In the multilateral realm and in the quest to diversify away from the sole reliance on Western power in pursuit of survival (including as reflected in their foreign policy agenda) and thus diversify the cognitive/political sources on which the state’s, and the broader region’s, emerging collective identity (and political culture) feed, the Azerbaijani elite have also embraced Turkey’s (and Kazakhstan’s) efforts at, and have grown themselves active in, promoting integration among Turkic-speaking states across the post-Soviet space; an effort that now saw the setting up in October 2009 of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (or Turkic Council), “the first voluntary alliance of Turkic states in history” (Halil Akinci, the founding Secretary-General of the Council), with Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan as its founding members. With the Council’s portfolio of ongoing projects including the launch of the Turkic world TV channel TRT Avaz in March 2009 and the introduction of a mechanism for closer cooperation among Turkic diasporas across the globe and its envisaged portfolio featuring the setup of the Turkic University Association and the writing of a common history textbook, the organisation is likely to bear important cultural repercussions across the populations of the states involved.

Azerbaijan’s continued engagement with Russia, particularly intensified during Ilham Aliyev’s tenure as president following an extended period of coolness under Heydar Aliyev (and Yeltsin in Russia) and now reaching an unprecedented degree of (outward) intimacy following Russia’s assault on Ukraine and its associated (and intended) come-back in the post-Soviet region (and in view of the West’s inability to offer a viable counterpoise to Moscow on the latter’s efforts to this effect), has fed and informed authoritarian tendencies in governance and the overall persistence of a patrimonial—patriarchal—political culture. The latter linkage, including as expressed in the continued widespread presence of Russian language education provision (both at the high school and university levels), Russian-language bookstores, Russian-language newspapers and magazines, and Russian cultural houses, has also served to sustain the presence of Russian culture and the Russian language within the purview of the national cognitive space and in that sense acted as a counterweight to the elite’s effort to nationalise the discursive landscape of official communication and people’s daily interaction on one hand and to the post-independence onslaught of English as a new lingua franca and a conduit of Western knowledge and globalisation on the other. Tellingly and as a reflection of the exogenous nature of this latter dynamic, those educated in the Russian language in Azerbaijan today often find themselves locked in a tightly confined discursive universe within which they function, one detached from both domestic societal and broader international dynamics, while those in the Azerbaijani “sector” of education whose knowledge of foreign languages, international exposure and involvement with domestic and international “civil society” practices have by now evolved to be by far greater and deeper than what most of their Russian-language peers could boast of these days (their knowledge of Russian also often being far better than the latter’s knowledge of Azerbaijani) tend to develop a more multi-faceted identity and as such come closer in that respect to the internationally educated Azerbaijani youth.

Azerbaijan in the wake of independence also engaged in active cooperation with and thus opened itself up to the influence of the Moslem world, including the Arab Middle East (primarily in the context of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), an effort largely driven by an imperative—particularly acute in the early years of independence—to counterbalance the Armenian propaganda machine in the information war the two sides waged around their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the perceived advantage Yerevan has been enjoying to this effect within the Western purview (it was Pakistan, for example, then a non-permanent member
of the UN Security Council, that pushed for the adoption of the four UNSC resolutions in 1993 demanding an immediate withdrawal of all Armenian troops from the Azerbaijani territories the latter occupied) and a reality that, on a par with the upswing of Turkish influence (particularly in the context of work by Turkish educational establishments across the country), in considerable measure accounted for what many dubbed an “Islamic revival” in this post-Soviet state. Not only did this dual opening (to Turkey and the Arab world, including the latter through the intermediary of Russia’s Northern Caucasus) inform the rising number, and the rising with and rising reliance on the Islamic world in pursuit of geopolitical aspirations associated therewith, on one hand, and the elite’s continuous reference to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent regions in the public discourse and excess militarisation associated therewith, on one level, and the elite’s effort to revive and actively promote cultural heritage at home and abroad (cultural nationalism) and spearhead cultural developments and advancement internationally, on the other—has effectively served to push Islam (particularly Sunni Islam), as an alternative channel for popular mobilisation and thus a potential challenge to regime stability and elite survival, outside the officially sanctioned realm of public dynamics. The Baku government, for example, has never been enthusiastic about the operation of Turkish-sponsored mosques across the country, for, given the latter’s Sunni disposition (and their lying outside the reach of state control), they have been perceived as introducing and promoting a sectarian—Sunni–Shia—divide across the largely Shia Azerbaijani social spectrum, thereby transforming the dominant cultural, indeed nationalised, representations of Islam into a more genuine—religious—understanding of its role in the country’s ideological landscape. On one level, this prompted the elite themselves to sponsor the construction of a number of new, and the reconstruction of some of the existing, mosques (of which by far the largest—the “Heydar” mosque—was inaugurated in December 2014) and otherwise promote Islamic culture, including across the multilateral plane of engagement (e.g. by having Baku selected as the capital of Islamic Culture in the context of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in 2009 and as the venue for the Islamic Games in 2017). On another level, Islamic penetration has been mitigated by a reality that much of the Islamic world itself—in view of its own recognition game it had been forced to play upon achieving independence from the grips of Western imperialism in the wake of WWI and/or WWII—has been subject to the homogenising, and sanitising, influence of Western modernity and secularism and hence traditional values, and Islam as a major expression thereof—while still overwhelmingly present in state discourse—have been pushed to the margins of micro-level dynamics of public life in most of these states. Saudi Arabia being a major exception to this effect, it was not until January 2015 that the Baku elite, given the rapidly shifting contours of geopolitics around them, chose to reach out to and seriously engage with this country.

Domestic Legitimation

The elite’s domestic needs for security and recognition have been ambivalent to Western discourse, less than favourable to Islam, rather favourable to the Russian cultural presence, and rather unfavourable or at best relatively neutral towards the Turkish element comprising the cultural matrix of the nation’s social dynamics.

First, the elite’s choice of and reliance on secular, and homogenously empty, nationalism as a principal modality for domestic legitimation—including as expressed in the elite’s continuous reference to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent regions in the public discourse and excess militarisation associated therewith, on one hand, and the elite’s effort to revive and actively promote cultural heritage at home and abroad (cultural nationalism) and spearhead cultural developments and advancement internationally, on the other—has effectively served to push Islam (particularly Sunni Islam), as an alternative channel for popular mobilisation and thus a potential challenge to regime stability and elite survival, outside the officially sanctioned realm of public dynamics. The Baku government, for example, has never been enthusiastic about the operation of Turkish-sponsored mosques across the country, for, given the latter’s Sunni disposition (and their lying outside the reach of state control), they have been perceived as introducing and promoting a sectarian—Sunni–Shia—divide across the largely Shia Azerbaijani social spectrum, thereby transforming the dominant cultural, indeed nationalised, representations of Islam into a more genuine—religious—understanding (and practice) of the faith; a perception that might have factored in the ruling elite’s decision to close down in 2009, if for allegedly legitimate (technical) reasons, both of the two “Turkish” mosques (sponsored/built, that is, by the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, or Diyanet) operating in the capital (one of which was later re-opened). Another frequented Sunni mosque of Salafi disposition in the capital—the Abu Bakr mosque—was also closed down in August 2008 in response to a grenade attack on the mosque that left three people dead and at least 13 injured. The imposing “Heydar” mosque the government built in part over Turkish complaints about the meager number of Sunni mosques in downtown Baku has been designed, as a matter of compromise, to service both the Shia and the Sunni segments of the population at once.

Second, the place and role of Western discourse in the elite’s pursuit of domestic legitimation has in many ways been ambivalent. On one level, the elite have been
keen to promote Western modernity and associated consumerism (including by introducing the mushrooming chains of modern brand stores and restaurants all across the capital city) as expressions of continuous development and progress and as such another key mechanism to nurture their legitimacy at home thereby opening a door to Western cultural penetration. On another level, rising levels of Western penetration, particularly as reflected in the societal internalisation of Western norms and understandings (including the associated values of human rights and liberal democracy) and the mounting pressure—including by agitated groups from within—towards instituting democratic forms of governance, have rendered the elite increasingly resistant to the deepening of this latter dynamic, Western democratic discourse increasingly viewed as a neo-imperialist mechanism of dominance and control and as such as a direct threat to regime stability and survival; a reality that, among other developments, closed the door of government funding for the nationals’ pursuit of undergraduate education in the United States.

The two dynamics underlying this schizophrenic landscape of elite intentionality vis-à-vis Western knowledge structures have combined and collided to prompt the elite, in the long run, to seek a formula whereby Western consumerist culture and modernity would enter the state’s increasingly vibrant cultural matrix without the collateral effect of liberal/democratic political penetration; while, in the immediate run, inciting them, on one hand, to undermine the available mechanisms for Western penetration at home, including as expressed in the government’s ban on international broadcasts on the country’s national frequencies since January 2009 and the delegalisation of foreign capital in the NGO (non-state) sector in 2014, and, on the other hand, to look for and engage with the alternative foci of power across the globe, Azerbaijan’s recent involvements with such regional institutional formations as the African Union (observer since January 2011), the Non-Aligned Movement (full member since May 2011), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (dialogue partner since July 2015), as well as its deepening engagement with the United Nations (2012–2013 UN Security Council non-permanent member) and Latin American states (Azerbaijani embassies opened in Mexico in November 2009, Argentina in August 2010, and Brazil in 2012) grounded in this latter line of “operational” thinking.

And third, and not least given the country’s immediate Soviet past, but also in view of President Ilham Aliyev’s education-conditioned socio-cultural disposition, the composition of the ruling elite in Azerbaijan under Ilham Aliyev has been dominated by Russian-speaking (if often Western-exposed) individuals—often with a dual education background, Russian (whether in the Russian language in Azerbaijan or in Russia, or indeed elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, e.g. Ukraine) and Western—a reality that has rendered the elite positively inclined towards, and their domestic legitimacy dependent upon the continued presence of, the Russian and, to a lesser degree, Western elements of the country’s identity matrix and resistant to, or at best ignorant of, the Islamic and Turkish components of the same. In what is just one expression of this latter reality and notwithstanding an allegedly important contribution, the Baku Turkish Anadolu lyceum (so far the only high school in Baku sponsored and operated directly by the Turkish government) made to raising educational standards in Azerbaijan’s secondary education provision (particularly at an initial stage of the country’s independence and as expressed in the consistently high results its graduates display in the centrally administered national university admission tests), and despite numerous efforts on the part of the Turkish government to that effect, the Azerbaijani government has been consistently reluctant to allow for the second such Turkish government-sponsored school to open in Baku. Other Turkish (if non-governmental) educational establishments operating in the country as part of the so-called Gulen (or Hizmet) movement, of which there were at least 27 (including the Qafqaz University, a private school, and 12 lyceums and at least 13 Araz pre-University preparatory courses dispersed across the country’s various regions), had been recurrently facing political and broader societal pressure and scrutiny of various kinds, given the rather clandestine nature of the movement’s operation and its allegedly subversive longer-term political agenda, until they, save the University, were finally forced to close down in June 2014, including as an extension of recent political developments in Turkey itself.

The Historical Embeddedness of Identity Formation: The Heterogeneity of Identity Sources of Foreign Policy

The degree of their presence in and bearing on the cultural matrix of the nation’s identity today largely derivative as it is from a host of exogenous influences and grounded as such in the elite’s pursuit of recognition and survival, all four cultural elements have been endogenous to, and historically embedded in, Azerbaijan’s internal dynamics, the country’s tricolour flag (first adopted in November 1918 and readopted in February 1991) embodying three of the components (Turkic heritage; modernity and progress; and Islam) and the presence in the country of an extensive segment of the pre-existent Russian-language population in the wake of inde-
pendence reflecting the nation’s historical embeddedness in a Russian cultural milieu.

Indeed, Islam arrived in this geography in the seventh century with Arabs and shrouded itself in a Shia cloak in the early 16th century with the establishment of the Safavi (Iranian) empire, while the country had been governed by Turkic rulers and had been part of Turkic state-like formations, not without important interruptions, since at least the 11th century and had been incorporated into the Russian (and later Soviet) empire in the early 19th century; a vibrant history that defined the complexity of the nation’s religious, linguistic, and partly cultural identity that has persisted to date.

Against this historical backdrop, Azerbaijan had also witnessed the rise of the home-grown, if European-inspired, cultural-enlightenment movement in Baku in the late 19th–early 20th century, a development that resulted in the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) in May 1918—effectively the first Moslem secular democracy in the Islamic world. The nation had also been the first among Moslem states and among the first globally to extend suffrage to women in 1918; had seen the production and staging of what was effectively the first opera in the Moslem Middle East (Leyli and Majnun, 1908), this creatively based on a dynamic synthesis of traditional mugham and European classical music; and had also witnessed the setting up and opening in Baku of what was effectively the first secular school for Moslem girls across the Russian empire (1901)—complex dynamics exposing the historical endogeneity of both democratic liberal knowledge and modernity on one hand and Islam and traditionalism on the other in the country’s cultural profile. Both of these cognitive preferences are engrained in the contemporary fabric of the country’s identity, including as expressed in its urban architecture; the country widely perceived, by the elite and across the society alike, as “a crossroads between East and West” and the capital hailed by many as “the easternmost city of Europe and the westernmost city of Asia” with “Old Baku,” to cite Eldar Gasimov, the male representative of Azerbaijan’s winning duo in the 2012 Eurovision contest, “virtually screaming that you are in the East,” while “outside the old city a real Europe” begins. The historical endogeneity of these two seemingly opposing knowledge structures to the contemporary dynamics of state identity is particularly noteworthy given the active efforts of agents in both the Moslem Middle East (including Turkey and Iran) and the West to impose respectively Islamic/traditional and liberal/democratic notions and understandings upon Azerbaijan as exogenous values to be adopted (rather than endogenously nurtured ideals to move back to), on one hand, and dichotomise the two (as one inevitably threatening the existence of, rather than organically congruent with, the other), on the other.

The endogenous social-cultural dynamics have also been grounded in a more recent history associated with post-independence state building. Thus, Azerbaijani society, in view of the heterogeneity of educational opportunities opened to them beyond the limits of the national realm and given the inadequacy of tertiary education provision at home, have grown intensely stratified by educational background and associated cultural attributes (including and primarily language), between and among those who received education abroad (this group internally divided among those who received education in different countries, first and foremost Turkey, the United States, and across Europe) and those who only studied locally (the latter group, in turn, divided between those who received education in the Russian language and those who studied in Azerbaijani, as well as those who studied in Turkish lyceums). With representatives of the two groups socialised in different ways—the condition of divergent socialisation sustained through tightly confined networking patterns they end up following upon graduation—they evolve to embody distinct lifestyles and espouse variant, often conflicting, visions for the country’s future political development, including the foreign policy direction the latter is ought to follow. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy—coined as balanced since the early days of independence—reflected nearly perfectly this post-colonial heterogeneity of Azerbaijani society (and its elite), divided as it has been and continuously balancing between the West and Russia on one hand and the Moslem world and Israel on the other.

In Lieu of a Conclusion
A few concluding remarks are in order.

First, the embedded nature of Azerbaijan’s identity dynamics has rendered it inherently unstable, the latter being a condition of the weakness of the postcolonial polity into which the country was re-born in the early 1990s (hence, the elite’s need for recognition), on one hand, and the lack of heritage of stable, uniform national identity markers from its pre-independence past (with the concomitant presence of several elements in the historically endogenous milieu of the Azerbaijani cultural realm having rendered the nation’s ideational space susceptible to elite manipulation), on the other. Consequently, even though nation-building in Azerbaijan has in many ways been elite-driven, or perhaps precisely in view of the top–down nature of its dynamics, there has been no single master discourse derivative from the elite level, for the elite have promoted divergent, often rival, discourses to accommodate the different (domestic and
foreign policy) agendas they have pursued in the context of the early years of state-building and their associated quest for recognition and survival.

Second, and in view of the above, in the context of the unfolding state-building, with the elite compelled to address and cope with a number of associated challenges, including various external and internal state- and regime-security concerns (state-building and regime-building here understood as a congruent whole), no single national(ist) discourse is possible, for nation-building always finds itself subservient to state-building, a reality that results in a very divided discursive landscape underlying the dynamics of nation-building, marginalised as the latter is in light of the immediate, often ad hoc, demands of state-building. Consequently, the lesser number of, and the less severe, challenges associated with state-building (particularly in the security realm) the elite stand to face—the more self-sufficient, that is, the elite are in terms of state/regime security provision—the more emancipated they are from the need for external support (and hence recognition), the more coherent and uniform the elite-driven nationalist discourse grows to be. Further, with multiple discourses being patronised by the state, the identity outcome is likely to be a function of bottom-up dynamics (the agency of change thus lying at the societal, rather than elite, level) and as such is contingent on the extent to which individual (including elite-sponsored) narratives are successful across and accepted within wider segments of the population outside their immediate intended consumers (e.g. if pan-Turkic ethno-nationalist discourse grows popular outside the confines of the Turkish-educated segments of the population, including for example given the broader exposure to Turkish broadcasting and the like).

Third, the tactical nature of the elite’s need to promote rival discourses domestically as a function of the hybridity of their domestic and foreign policy agendas resulted in the production of a negatively neutral—substance-free (nominal)—discursive space underlying the country’s ideational field, such that one needs to embody neutral dispositions (formalism) in all of one’s social and public engagements to be accepted as a legitimate member within one’s social and political milieu; a reality that has manifested itself particularly strongly in popular and state attitudes towards Islam (an average—legitimate—self-identified Moslem in an Azerbaijani nominal context embodying a profile of someone who does not pray, does not grow a beard, never attends a mosque, does not know a single ayah from the Quran, and consumes alcohol).

And fourth, and to specify further the above, because it is promoted in view of the elite’s need for external recognition and curbed given the imperatives of domestic legitimation, the kind of Islam “left” for the majority of the population to engage is what Ali Hasanov in the opening quote above proudly refers to as the “Azerbaijani model of Islam,” Islam as a nominal cultural trait to be discarded (and hence with little consequence for personal dynamics) rather than a faith-based lifestyle to be strictly followed, this deformation itself a remnant of the country’s Soviet past (hence not indigenously Azerbaijani after all): in pursuit of nationalism-based legitimacy with the empire’s Moslem population, the Soviet elite had sought to undermine and subvert true Islamic practices and dispositions in Moslem-majority territories under their control given their potential to foster transnational bonds and loyalties and thus viewed as posing a threat to the Soviet nationality policy and the staunchly secular ideology the latter entailed; concomitantly, they had welcomed (or in the least had not actively resisted) the wider spread of “folk” Islam, this perceived as promoting subnational identities and attachments (and hence posing a lesser threat), on one hand, and helping sustain the patriarchal social structures (thus facilitating Soviet rule in rural, traditional, areas otherwise left outside the Party’s control), on the other.

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Further Reading
Georgia: Foreign Policy Identity in the Domestic Arena as a Subject of Contestation
By Salome Minesashvili and Levan Kakhishvili, Tbilisi

Abstract:
In general, Georgians strongly support their leaders’ decision to opt for a European identity and foreign policy. However, some aspects of this choice remain hard for the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) to accept, particularly issues concerning the status of the GOC vis-à-vis other churches within Georgia and discrimination concerning gender and sexual identity issues. Due to Church opposition, the politicians have to make compromises.

Identity Options for Georgia
Since becoming independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been struggling to establish itself in the international arena. The first decade of independence was a turbulent period during which Georgia did not manage to frame a definitive foreign policy orientation. The country went through three armed conflicts: two of them in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and one civil war in the streets of the capital. The total collapse of the Georgian economy further exacerbated the situation. Crime and corruption raged in the country.

Since the early 1990s Georgia had to submit to Russian influence: in 1993 Georgia was forced to enter the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and had to accept Russian peacekeeping forces in its breakaway regions as well as the presence of the Russian military bases located outside the conflict areas. Georgia, in other words, emerged as a post-Soviet state with limited sovereignty.

Yet Georgia is located at the crossroads of a few regions, which gives the country the possibility to adopt different regional identities including: (South) Caucasus, post-Soviet, Middle Eastern, Central Asian, Black Sea region and (South-) Eastern Europe. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political elite consciously decided which identity option was more appropriate for Georgia at that particular time.

In 1999, when Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe, former speaker of the parliament Zurab Zhvania, in what became a historic statement, proclaimed: “I am Georgian, therefore, I am European.” Later, however, after the 2003 Rose Revolution, political power was seized by an elite, which was young and western-educated. Under the presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia became vocal about its foreign policy orientation. The country adopted strong rhetoric promoting its western orientation and aimed at rapid integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the EU. For this purpose, the elite made a conscious choice of Georgia as a country belonging to the Black Sea region and ideally as part of Eastern or South-Eastern Europe. The Black Sea region is the closest it gets to the West as it includes two EU members—Bulgaria and Romania—and three members of NATO—Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. As a result Georgia, discarding any other regional identity option, focused exclusively on those identities that moved the country closer to Europe.

Georgia’s determination to “return to the European family,” as Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions is often framed by politicians, has been institutionalized in strategic documents and more recently has been codified by the parliament. In strategic documents, such as the National Security Concepts, foreign policy strategy, etc., Georgia is presented as a country located in the Black Sea region or (South) Eastern Europe. While linking Georgia more closely with Europe, this approach is an efficient way for detaching the country from the post-Soviet space, which is closely associated with Russia, the influence of which Tbilisi is striving to escape.

Europeanness is the identity key politicians are constructing discursively and declaring to overlap with the Georgian identity. However, to what extent Europeanness complies with national identity is a matter of contestation. This conflict is particularly evident when value-linked changes are introduced in the country that stem from Western countries or institutions.

Legislative Amendment on Religious Minorities
Religious diversity and equal grounds for different denominations are markers of Western values. Before July 2011, religious groups in Georgia could only register as noncommercial legal entities under the provisions of a law that usually pertains to NGOs, unions or foundations. The only exception applied to the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), which was granted a special status by the 2002 Constitutional Agreement with the Georgian state. Various religious groups long sought legal status and the country was frequently criticized
by international organizations for lacking the appropriate legislation. In April 2011 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated its concern about the “lack of a proper legal status of and legal protection for denominations and faiths other than the Georgian Orthodox Church” and called on Georgia to adopt a law to address these concerns.

In response, at the end of June 2011, the Parliament of Georgia started discussing an amendment to the civil code and within five working days adopted a law that granted religious groups the right to register as legal entities under public law. The amendment applied to religious groups as defined in Council of Europe member states which had historical ties to Georgia. It triggered tense public debates and marked a serious confrontation between the GOC and the Saakashvili administration.

The GOC and its leader Illia II, along with the Christian-Democratic Movement, protested against the hastened process of law-making. The church condemned the fact that the amendment had been adopted without consulting the Patriarchate and called on the ruling party to refrain from approving it until the law was publicly discussed. Besides its fear that it would lose its monopoly, the GOC was primarily concerned about the ownership of some disputed churches that were also claimed by the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Catholic Church in Georgia. The GOC opposed the amendment, arguing that it did not have the same status in neighboring states, particularly Armenia. Nevertheless President Saakashvili signed the law, leading the Patriarch to announce that the new legislation violated both state and church interests and would cause negative consequences.

A few days after the legislative change, thousands of parishioners led by their priests protested in Tbilisi, calling the law dangerous for the state. As a result, an explanatory document was attached to the amendment reconfirming the Constitutional agreement and restating the privileged status of the GOC, a move that ended the protests.

Public opinion polls demonstrate that the majority of the population supports the GOC position. According to NDI polls from 2011, of those who were aware of the amendment, 69% did not support it. Over 80% thought that the Parliament should have consulted with the public and the GOC before adopting the law.

**Anti-Discrimination Law**

Values are an important aspect of identity for any people. While there is a stereotype that Georgians are a tolerant nation, others argue that Georgians find it hard to accept the “different.” In this case, “different” may mean, but is not limited to, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. In the course of the visa liberalization process with the EU, Georgia has to comply with certain conditions, including the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation.

The initial bill, although lacking a definition of discrimination, listed major identity markers that are a common basis for discrimination. The list included ethnic and religious minorities, sexual orientation and gender identity, among others.

However, the Georgian Orthodox Church was dissatisfied with this list and the formulation of certain clauses of the bill. Therefore, the Church intervened and exerted pressure over the parliament and the government, which led to a reformulation of the draft law. The influence of the Church is derived from various factors, including the high level of religiosity among the population and the high level of trust towards the head of the church from the people. Therefore, the Georgian Orthodox Church has a distinct role in Georgian politics and society—that of a guardian of Georgian identity and culture. The popularity of Patriarch Ilia II is the cornerstone of the church’s influence. According to an April 2014 opinion poll conducted by the National Democratic Institute, 96% of the population likes the Patriarch.

Moreover, the level of religiosity is quite high among the people. 85% of the population says religious beliefs are “important” or “very important” in making decisions in daily life. 12% is neutral and only 1% says religious beliefs are not important. These figures indicate that the Church and the Patriarch have a support base that any political party in any country could only dream of. Against this background, the mobilization capacity of the Church is extremely high and efficient. And it has proven to be so on various occasions, including with the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation.

The church spoke up against the law because it mentions “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” as a basis for discrimination. The church argued that Georgia does not need such laws as equality is guaranteed by the constitution. As a result of its pressure, the final version of the law has two clauses that elicited harsh criticism from civil society. The revised text not only removed the establishment of an Inspector, a new institution that would work against discrimination, but also states that discrimination is only punishable if it does not conflict with public morality or the constitutional agreement with the Georgian Orthodox Church. Consequently, civil society representatives argued that essentially Georgia had legalized discrimination, while the Church was still dissatisfied and claimed that Georgia had legalized perversion.
The result of this struggle was the formal fulfillment of the conditions required by the EU but lacking their essence. The goal seems to have been to give Georgia an antidiscrimination law, while what is written in the law seems to make potential discrimination a matter of choice. Besides, implementing the law has become less feasible without the institution of the Inspector.

Conclusion
Located at the intersection of various geographical and cultural crossroads, Georgia had multiple identity choices, given its historical ties with surrounding states and regions. However, disregarding this great diversity, the Georgian state has embraced an European identity and has been following a steady pro-Western foreign policy course for over a decade now. The idea of western integration is not only institutionalized but widely supported by the public. However, internal debates demonstrate that the extent to which identity supports Georgia’s foreign policy is a matter of question.

The cases of the religious minorities amendment and anti-discrimination bill show that the identity question is hotly contested in Georgia. The European identity and foreign policy course seems to be an elite choice which often equates European identity with national identity. However, national identity for some groups contradicts the values comprising the European identity. When European identity boils down to specific actions, it becomes a matter of contestation in the domestic arena. The Georgian Orthodox Church is one of the major narrators of national identity whose version often conflicts with that of the political elites. Because of the domestic opposition, political elites have to compromise to some extent. The cases presented here demonstrate that even though the Georgian nation is more or less unanimous in aspiring toward Western integration, its underpinning identity remains a matter of contestation.

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